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Abstract This study examined the IPO waiting period from offering to the
first trading day listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2018.
We find that firms that float shares to the general public have passed through
multiple layers of inspection by underwriters, auditors, institutional investors,
and regulatory bodies. The waiting period of the unseasoned issue is an essential
predictor of uncertainty associated with a firm. To test this proposition, we first
determine the endogenous and exogenous factors that influence IPO waiting
period. The results confirm that the firms offer price, percentage of shares after
issuance of IPO, book building mechanism, and SECP regime influence the
IPO waiting period. This study further finds that short waiting period IPOs
are associated with less ex-ante uncertainty, reducing the level of underpricing.
In addition, we report that during short waiting periods, IPOs are prone to less
return volatility and higher aftermarket stock performance.
Keywords : IPOs, waiting period, ex-ante uncertainty, underpricing, long-run
performance

1 Introduction
Initial public offering (IPO) is the most exciting event in a firm’s life span.
Issuing equities allows firms to go public for the first time, thus transforming
a firm’s ownership from private to public (Reiche 2014). A lot of studies have
examined the short- and long-term IPO performance (Mumtaz et al 2016; Chan
et al 2004; Loughran and Ritter 1995; Kim and Ritter 1999), the underwriter’s
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role in achieving a successful IPO (Bouis 2009), the survival of IPOs (Mumtaz
and Smith 2021; Guo and Brooks 2009), and hot IPO activity period (MMumtaz
and Smith 2021; Güçbilmez 2015; Brooks et al 2009). However, limited literature is available to examine the factors that affect the waiting period of an IPO
(Colaco and Hegde 2013; Dimovski and Ratcliffe 2011; Brooks et al 2009).
IPO waiting period refers to the time difference between the offering and
listing date (Brooks et al 2009). However, the waiting period for newly issued
shares varies across firms and markets (Mumtaz and Smith 2021; Brooks et al
2009). Does a question arise as to why some firms take less or more time to list on
the stock market? This study addresses this question by examining the factors
that cause the waiting period across firms. To list on the stock market and issue shares, a firm must submit an application, vet requisite documents, appoint
underwriters, choose a pricing mechanism, publish a prospectus, and scrutinize
auditors (Colaco and Hegde 2013). In this context, some firms smoothly pass
through this process, and some face difficulties. Our basic intuition is that the
firms that quickly pass-through standard procedures have a short waiting period
and faceless uncertainty and risk. The aftermarket performance of unseasoned
issues also depends on the waiting period.
The waiting period is crucial for investors and issuers (Chen et al 2004).
Tsangarakis 2004 states that listing delays create doubts that an IPO’s quality
expectations are inaccurate. Subsequently, it creates concerns for investors regarding the firm’s financial condition, and information asymmetry will set the
investors’ desired price (Beaulieu and Sodjahin 2008). Considering the consequences of a higher waiting period, Kumar (2004) argued that a long waiting
period causes uncertainty and risk associated with the offer. As a result, investors face illiquidity that can be compensated by offering a lower price, affecting underpricing. During the listing delays, market conditions may change
will ultimately cause a revision in the firm’s actual value and cause the magnitude of underpricing (Chen et al 2004). In the light of the above consequences,
our research hypothesizes that a short waiting period is associated with less
uncertainty, less underpricing, and better stock performance once the IPO is
conducted successfully.
Pakistan is an emerging market and it is important to determine the factors
that cause waiting periods of unseasoned issues. Thus, we investigate the ex-ante
uncertainty factors that influence the listing delay based on the sample size of
166 IPOs listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 1995 to 2018. First,
we investigate the effect of endogenous and exogenous factors on the IPO waiting
period. Second, we also identify the factors that cause the waiting period. Third,
we examine the effect of the waiting period on post-IPO uncertainty. Lastly, we
determine the impact of the waiting period on long-run performance using the
buy-and-hold abnormal returns and calendar time portfolio techniques. We find
that the offer price decreases uncertainty, consequently reducing the IPO waiting period (Dimovski and Ratcliffe 2011). Alternatively, the firm’s age and size
complicate the ownership structure; hence, higher scrutiny is required before
44
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going public, increasing the waiting period (Colaco et al 2018). This study also
identifies that firms that hold most shares after going public take less time to
list. Moreover, financial firms face a higher waiting period as they are more
prone to risk. Besides exante uncertainty, some exogenous variables also cause
the waiting period. We document that IPO issued during the hot activity period
takes less time to start trading activities. An important finding of this study
is that IPOs floated under the SECP regime fulfill procedural activities in a
short span and registered quickly compared to the CLA regime. Likewise, this
study finds that the firm takes more time to go public under conducive market
conditions.
IPO waiting period exhibits ex-ante uncertainty properties; it should be reflected in the post-IPO performance. We examine the waiting period’s impact
on the short-run performance and report that a higher waiting period leads
to inflating underpricing. As indicated, investors are compensated for the time
lag by offering lower share prices (Kumar 2004). Using the return volatility,
we capture the effect of the waiting period on post-IPO uncertainty. For this
reason, we measure the initial returns from 21 trading days to 79, 21 to 142, 21
to 205, and 21 to 268. We argue that firms take more time to go public, and
face higher uncertainty in the aftermarket pricing performance. This evidence
holds when there is uncertainty involved before the issuance of an IPO. As firms
take more time to go public, their aftermarket performance is affected, and return volatility increases. This study employs buy-and-hold abnormal returns to
gauge long-run performance and finds that long waiting time IPOs underperform over three years. Using the calendar time portfolio approach, we report
that firms with short and long waiting periods underperform in the long run.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the earlier
studies, Section 3 elaborates on the IPOs in Pakistan, Section 4 discusses the
data and research methodology, Section 5 examines the empirical findings, and
Section 6 concludes the study.

2 Literature review
A delay in IPO listing causes uncertainty for both the investors and issuers.
Earlier studies (Colaco et al 2018; Colaco and Hegde 2013) empirically tested the
consequences of delay in IPO listing. Any uncertainty in the listing process may
discourage firms from going public, decreasing the investment opportunities.
Moreover, firms that face a listing delay may face a rise in stock price volatility
(Cong et al 2017).
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Under the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis, the IPO waiting period is directly related to the firm’s characteristics. The offer price is one of the proxies to capture
ex-ante uncertainty and generally reflects an IPO’s quality. A high offer price
Business Review: (2022) 17(1):43-68
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indicates that a firm growth performance is promising, and there are less risk
and uncertainty involved while investing in new shares (Brooks et al 2009). As
a reasonable offer price declines the chances of delay, it allows a firm to quickly
list on the stock exchange. The firm’s age is another proxy to determine the uncertainty of any firm. As the firm gets older, the degree of uncertainty associated
with its cashflows declines (Kim and Ritter 1999). This decline in uncertainty
allows firms to list on the stock market quickly. Some schools of thought believe
that complicated structures may be difficult to scrutinize and take longer to go
public (Colaco and Hegde 2013). Through an IPO, the company’s shares are
spread among investors, and hence the firm’s ownership and control are somehow affected. The issuer never wishes to lose control, and the company’s profit
is not evenly distributed; instead, the owner emphasizes building his empire.
When most of the firm’s shares belong to the issuer, the underwriters excessively
underprice new shares to make an IPO attractive. The excessive underpricing
creates a high demand for shares, and thus the shares are not accumulated by a
few investors; instead, these are widely spread among many investors (Brennan
and Franks 1997). In case of the low offer price, the issues instantly participate
by the investors on the subscription date, and the company is listed in quick
time.

High-quality underwriters have more reputational capital, allowing them to
have good terms with institutional investors. Consequently, they create demand
for unseasoned issues. This suggests that high-quality underwriters are more
efficient in managing the IPO process and take the firm public quicker (Colaco
et al 2018). Considering the underwriter’s prestige, high prestige underwriters
are more efficient in promoting the offerings and creating investor interest, thus,
speeding the process of IPOs (Bouis 2009). Welch (1989) proposed a signalling
mechanism where issuers reveal the required information as a signal to know
the quality of IPOs. Return on asset (ROA) is used as a proxy to identify the
earnings; high ROA signals favorable future growth of a firm. Moreover, Spence
(1978) explains that issuers provide information to the investors to know the
firm’s uncertainties. A high ROA forces investor to reveal their demand to make
firms be listed on the stock exchange within minimal days.

One of the reasons for high information asymmetry is the pricing mechanism
followed by many countries. Under the fixed price method, the offer price is decided before the subscription, and the price is not set based on the investors
demand. This also deprives investors of extracting the required information.
This information gap causes a delay in creating interest for the investors, which
further inflates the listing time of an IPO. In terms of the book-building mechanism, the offer price is determined by the investors demand, and consequently,
underwriters know the actual worth beforehand (Yong 2015; Chowdhry and
Sherman 1996). Based on investors’ demand, shares are purchased quickly, and
the time to list an IPO on the stock exchange is reduced.
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2.2 Empirical Evidence
To examine the IPO waiting period, Beaulieu and Sodjahin 2008 report that
a large-sized syndicate causes an extended time as many managers and comanagers are involved in the IPO process which may cause competition and disagreement among the syndicate members which increases the IPO duration. Further, the results revealed that high technology firms go public quicker. Beaulieu
and Sodjahin 2008 further examine that overleveraged firms with greater cash
pressure and the firms conducting IPOs for investment purposes have a short
waiting period. Using the data of Chinese Ashare IPOs, Brooks et al (2009) analyze the influence of issuing systems on the waiting period of IPOs. The historical
evidence shows that the approval system takes a short time to list an IPO compared to the administrative system. Besides issuing system, the study’s findings
show that offer price tends to increase the average waiting period while issuing
size is negatively linked with a waiting period. Moreover, market sentiments
increase the duration of IPOs to be listed, whereas high prestige underwriter
has a short waiting period.
Similarly, Bouis (2009) investigates how the waiting period responds to market conditions from the registration to the IPO listing date. He reports that
firms are likely to complete their IPO quickly when the market index is high
and when the market return and volatility are low. During market volatility,
firms are more likely to alter the terms of the issue, which means the firms need
to re-register with the SEC, explaining the positive relationship between market
volatility and the waiting period. Moreover, Dimovski and Ratcliffe (2011)indicate that large-sized firms and high prestige underwriters take a short time to
list on the stock market. In comparison, the high leverage firms are to be listed
slowly. Likewise, Colaco and Hegde (2013) show that high prestige underwriters
reduce the ex-ante uncertainty and decline the IPO waiting period. On the other
hand, frequent amendments, high price updates, and increased market return
volatility lead to greater ex-ante uncertainty and cause the waiting period to
inflate. Moreover, the firm may go public quicker if there are favorable market
conditions if it is a pioneer and technological firm. Colaco and Hegde (2013)
used negative binomial regression and reported that the waiting period is negatively related to underwriter prestige. They further document that underwriters
issued IPOs using the book building process takes more time to go public.
Analyzing the effect of uncertainty on the listing time of IPOs, Guo and
Brooks (2009) report that firms with high issue prices are negatively linked to
the waiting period. Cong et al (2017) document that the length of waiting time
is less for mature and high leveraged firms. Using a sample of 2056 Indian IPOs,
Shah et al (1995) examines what causes a delay in listing IPO and concludes that
high issue size causes to list in a short span. In another study, Seth et al (2019)
find that anchor-backed firms take less time to go public. Moreover, firms with
asymmetric information and ex-ante uncertainty take more time to be listed on
the stock exchange.

Business Review: (2022) 17(1):43-68

Published by iRepository, July 2022

47

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol17/iss1/3
DOI: 10.54784/1990-6587.1462

Zanib and Mumtaz
Mumtaz and Smith (2021) investigates the duration from the offering to the
listing of IPOs issued on the PSX from 1995 to 2017. They study the listing
process of IPOs considering regulatory regimes and the factors that influence
the duration of unseasoned issues. Using the Cox proportional hazard model,
they find that offer price, percentage of legal entity-owned shares, issue size,
age of the firm, and price discovery mechanism are the factors that cause IPO
duration. They document that IPO waiting time from listing to offering has
improved during the SECP regime.

3 Overview of IPOs in Pakistan
Issuing shares through IPO is not a novel phenomenon to raise capital in the
Pakistani market. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation was the first company
listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange on April 2, 1949, without issuing a
prospectus. In 1953, M/s Hussain Industries took the initiative of issuing a
prospectus in Pakistan to invite subscriptions from the public. Between 1953
and 1990, the issuing process of IPOs in Pakistan remained sluggish. The government carried out various reforms like deregulation, liberalization, and privatization to strengthen the capital market’s transparency and efficiency. Many
IPOs were issued since 1991 as private firms desired to enhance financing opportunities, diversify ownership, and create a safe exit for mature firms. The
Corporate Law Authority (CLA) had to govern the capital market reforms to
guarantee transparency and compliance with laws. From 1991 to 1996, there
was a substantial upsurge in the volume of unseasoned equity issues. An independent body named the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
(SECP) was established in 1997 to improve the capital market while CLA was
abolished. SECP became operational on January 1, 1999, its function was to
execute reforms in the financial market to make the listing process and going
public more efficient. These practices and reforms created a vibrant environment for private entities to carry out IPOs in Pakistan.
However, IPOs started to decline during 1998 and onwards due to security
issues and the sanctions imposed on Pakistan because of nuclear tests carried
out in Pakistan. Only one IPO was conducted in 1998, followed by none in 1999.
After the 9/11 incident, Pakistan’s stock market performance remained low and
shrunk until 2003. The stock market began to recover after 2004 due to the rise
in trading activities. During 2005 and 2006, the KSE-100 index showed strong
performance because of better macroeconomic conditions. These improvements
were mainly due to PTCL and National Refinery’s privatization process which
attracted considerable investment. Figure 1 shows how the volume of IPOs
fluctuated during the entire period. During the 2008 financial crisis, the PSX
crashed and after the intensity of IPOs remained low. The deterioration in the
volume of IPOs from 2009 to date is mainly due to uncertain economic and
political scenarios. Currently, there are very limited IPOs going on in Pakistan
but due to CPEC projects and some other developments in the market, there is
48
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Fig. 1: IPOs in Pakistan This figure presents the historical trend of IPOs in Pakistan from
1995 to 2018

a probability that IPOs will increase in the future. Further, the SECP proposed
legitimate amendments to encourage firms to raise capital from the primary
equity market. The reason behind this is to stimulate capital formation by facilitating issuers, decreasing the cost of an IPO, and protecting the general public’s
interest by enhancing disclosures.

4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
The data relating to the IPO waiting period is obtained from the IPO prospectus
and the SECP. The sample period is taken from January 1995 to December 2018.
The sample size is 166 IPOs listed on the PSX during the study period. The data
relevant to the firm characteristics is obtained from the IPO prospectus. Both
financial and non-financial firms are considered to analyze the time duration
from offering to listing date. The data about market sentiments and the closing
prices of IPOs are taken primarily from the PSX. The data on regulatory regime
and listing procedure is taken from SECP.

4.2 Determinants of IPO waiting period
This section identifies the factors that influence IPO waiting period. We incorporate endogenous and exogenous factors to determine their effect on the waiting
period. Endogenous factors include offer price, firms age, leverage, firms size,
Business Review: (2022) 17(1):43-68
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ownership, industry, and price discovery mechanism. Endogenous factors (Colaco et al 2018 cover UW prestige, market sentiments, hot IPO activity period,
and regulatory regime. To test our hypotheses, we develop the following model:
waiting period = α0 + α1 of f er pricei + α2 agei + α3 leveragei + α4 sizei
+ α5 ownershipi + α6 Industryi + α7 price discoveryi + α8 market sentimenti
+ α9 hot ipo activityi + α10 regulatory regimei
(1)
where W aitingP eriodi is the difference between offering and listing dates of
an IP Oi , Of f er P ricei i refers to the price of the new shares, Agei is the time
difference from the year of foundation to year of IPO, Leveragei is the ratio of
total debt to total asset, Sizei refers to the firm size and it is measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets, Ownershipi is the percentage shares owned
by the firm after going public, Industryi is a dummy variable that assigns the
value of 1 if a non-financial firm issues IPO and 0 otherwise, Price Discoveryi is
a mechanism at which shares are issued, and it is used as a dummy variable. If
the IPO price is determined through the book-building process, it equals 1 and
0 for a fixed price method. UW P restigei refers to the underwriter’s reputation.
If a high reputed underwriter issues IPO, we assign the value equal to 1 and 0
otherwise. Market sentimenti is measured by stock market returns and calculated as the market returns on the offering date relative to the market returns
before 30 days offering date. Hot IPO Activityi is a dummy variable and if IPO
is issued in hot IPO activity, it is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise, and Regulatory
Regimei is also a categorical variable which is assigned a value of 1 if IPO is
issued under the CLA regime and 0 otherwise. The variables are explained in
the ensuing paragraphs.
Offer Price: The offer price reflects the quality of IPOs, and the underwriter determines it after evaluating the investors demand and issuers growth
performance. Guo and Brooks (2009) report a positive and significant relationship between the offer price and the waiting period. Other studies (Colaco et al
2018; Dimovski and Ratcliffe 2011) demonstrate that high offer price leads to a
quicker listing process
Firm age: The firm’s age at the time of issuance is critical in determining
the waiting period’s length. It is calculated by taking the difference from the
firm’s establishment date to the IPO issuance date. The firm’s age is inversely
related to the degree of risk and uncertainty associated with firms cash flows
and returns. As the firm gets older, its past performance will allow investors
to predict their future growth, and hence, investors will face less uncertainty
(Loughran and Ritter 1995; Chambers and Dimson 2009). Keeping in view the
minimal risks associated with the firm, it is assumed that firm age will negatively
affect the waiting period. However, considering older firms’ structure, they are
more complex to deal with and may require greater scrutiny, thus taking more
time to go public (Colaco et al 2018).
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Leverage: Leverage is measured by total debt to the total asset. Overleveraged firms are expected to complete IPO quickly because they desperately need
money (Beaulieu and Sodjahin 2008). However, some studies (Dimovski and
Ratcliffe 2011; Busaba 2006) document that firms with high debt to capital ratio tend to get rid of debt burden rather than expansion, which slow the IPO
listing process.
Size of the firm: The firm’s size is also an important variable that causes
the waiting period. Mumtaz and Smith (2021) argued that large-sized firms
might have more resources to list publicly by fulfilling all the PSX procedural
formalities, decreasing the uncertainty and risks associated with the firm. Hence,
large-sized firms may reduce the waiting period to list on the stock market. Alternatively, small-sized firms have less resources, leading to higher uncertainty,
and resultantly, they may take more time to go public.
Ownership: It refers to the percentage of shares held by a firm after going public. The ownership structure plays a significant role in determining the
firms performance and explaining underpricing in the IPO process. Brooks et al
(2009) found that ownership structure affects IPO duration, illustrating that a
higher proportion of shares owned by a firm leads to a short waiting period.
Industry: The industry variable is used as a dummy where firms are classified into financial and nonfinancial firms. Beaulieu and Sodjahin (2008) examined the association between non-financial firms and the waiting period of
IPO, and they found that firms take less time to go public. Thus, we assume a
negative relationship between industry and the waiting period.
Price discovery mechanism: In Pakistan, IPOs are generally issued through
fixed-price and bookbuilding mechanisms. Before 2009, the fixed price method
was only used to float shares but afterward, a book building mechanism was
introduced. The price discovery mechanism is used as a dummy variable, and
we assume that if IPO is issued using book building mechanism, it is treated as
one and zero otherwise.
Underwriter prestige: Several studies assessed the impact of the underwriters reputation on the IPO waiting period. High prestige underwriters usually
have good terms with institutional investors because of their high reputational
capital. This allows underwriters to quickly investigate the demand for new issues; they can take firms public quicker (Colaco et al 2018). We assume that
firms appoint high prestige underwriters and have an inverse relationship with
the waiting period. The prestige of underwriter is measured as (Megginson and
Weiss 1991; Kenourgios et al 2007).

CRi
prestige = Pn
i=0 CRi
Business Review: (2022) 17(1):43-68
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where i indicates the firm that floats new shares. CRj is the capital raised
by the underwriter j and the total number of underwriters involved in sample
IPOs is represented by n.
Market sentiments: Market sentiment is one of the most influencing factors that causes variation in an IPO’s duration. Bouis (2009) documents that
when market volatility is high or low, firms will take more time to go public as
market volatility causes uncertainties for future profit. Moreover, high market
returns cause IPO to delay because the firms expect high market valuations by
waiting. We measure the market sentiments as:
M arketsentiments = (

Im,o
Im−30days

− 1)

(3)

Where Im,0 = stock market return of an IPO on the offering date and Im,30days =
stock market return 30 days before offering date.
Hot IPO activity period: The IPO activity period is classified into hot
and cold periods (Ibbotson and Jaffe 1975). Previous studies (Colaco et al
(2018); Beaulieu and Sodjahin (2008)) empirically identify that IPOs are listed
faster during the hot IPO activity period as firms are likely to go public in
the wake of conducive market conditions. Alternatively, Colaco et al (2018)
document a negative relationship between the waiting period and the hot IPO
activity period. Hot IPO activity period is used as a dummy variable which
is equal to 1 for the years in which IPOs are issued more than average and 0
otherwise.
Regulatory regime: IPOs were issued in two regulatory regimes during the
sample period. To examine the regulatory regime’s effect on the IPO waiting
period, this study categorizes CLA as 1 and 0 for SECP.

underpricing = α0 + α1 waiting periodi + α2 of f er pricei + α3 leveragei
+ α4 ROAi + α5 Sizei + α6 price discoveryi + α7 W Pi ∗ crisis

(4)

+ α8 regulatory regimei + α9 U W prestigei + α10 industryi + errori

4.3 Waiting period and underpricing
Given specific proxies of uncertainty and its relationship with the waiting period, we examine the factors that cause the magnitude of underpricing. Previous
studies (Colaco et al 2018) report that the waiting period positively influences
underpricing, while others identify an inverse relationship between the waiting period and underpricing. To test our proposition, we develop the following
model:
i −Opening pricei
∗100. ROA is measured by
where underpricingi = closing price
Of f er pricei
net profit after tax to total assets. In this model, we use two interaction terms.
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We interact the waiting period with the crisis period to investigate the waiting
period’s impact during crisis time on underpricing. We also interact the waiting
period with the regulatory regime to assess the waiting period’s influence under
the CLA regime.

4.4 Waiting period and post-IPO certainity
This section examines whether the waiting period has the predictive power to
assess post-IPO uncertainty or not. For this purpose, we incorporate IPO returns from the 21st day to 79th, 142nd, 205th, and 268th day respectively. We
measure returns by taking the difference between the market price of the IPO
on the 21st day and the offer price. We include the ex-ante uncertainty factors
along with the waiting period in the post IPO uncertainty model to investigate
whether the waiting period affects the long-run pricing behavior of an IPO or
not. We use return volatility as the benchmark to evaluate the long-run pricing
uncertainty of IPOs. To examine the impact of the waiting period on the 21st
to 79th, 142nd, 205th, and 268th day initial returns, we formulate the following
model (Colaco et al 2018)

returnsi = α0 + α1 waiting periodi + α2 U W prestigei + α3 industryi
+ α4 regulatory regimei + α5 issuing sizei + α6 crisisi + α7 sizei + errori

(5)

where return volatility is a proxy of the uncertainty associated with the aftermarket IPO performance.

4.5 Waiting period and long-run IPO performance
The post-IPO performance is analyzed to examine whether investors obtain
positive returns or not. Researchers (Jenkinson et al 2001; Loughran and Ritter
1995) argue that IPO underperforms compared to the benchmark index. Two
methodologies are commonly used to examine the long-run IPO performance
namely; buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and calendar time portfolio.
BHAR measures the longer-term IPO performance. In this technique, we match
each IPO firm with the non-IPO firm based on the firm’s size. We compute the
abnormal returns for the firm i over the time T (1, 2 and 3 years) as follows:
BHARTi =

t
Y

(1 + Ri,t ) −

t=1

t
Y

(1 + Rmatchedf irm,t )

(6)

t=1

where, Ri,t is the daily return of firm i at time t and Rmatchedf irm,t is the
matched firm’s return (size-based) at time t. Returns are calculated from the
first trading day to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd anniversary. T is the time for computing
the returns that shareholders have gained from the first listing date to 1, 2,
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and 3 years, respectively. The positive value of BHAR shows overperformance
whereas the negative value refers to underperformance compared to the sizebased matched firm index. This study also measures long-run IPO performance
using the Fama-French and Carhart models. Fama and French (1993) threefactor model is computed as:
Rp,t − Rf,t = α + β(Rmt − Rf,t ) + sSM Bt + hHM Lt + errort

(7)

Carhart (1997) four-factor model is used to gauge long-run performance.
Rp,t − Rf,t = α + β(Rmt − Rf,t ) + sSM Bt + hHM Lt + errort

(8)

where Rpt is the equally weighted monthly portfolio returns and Rmt is the
return of KSE-100 index in month t, Rf t is the T-bills rate in month t. (Rmt Rf t)
is the excess return of the market, and is the abnormal return. represents the
risk of how much a stock is exposed to changes in the overall market. SMB is
the small minus big firm returns, HML is the high minus low book to market
ratio returns, WML is the winner minus loser returns. SMB is measured through
market capitalization; the 36-month returns of each firm are sorted based on
their market capitalization from the smallest to the largest. The average onethird of the returns from the upper portion of the data and one-third average
from the lower portion of the data is calculated and subtracts the average small
size firm returns from big size firm returns. For HML, returns are sorted based on
the book to market ratio. In general, SMB shows the firms size, HML represents
a firm’s growth. To obtain the final value of WML for 36 months, the average
top returns are subtracted from the average lowest returns.

5 Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the IPO waiting period from 1995 to
2018. The average waiting period is 50 days with a minimum and a maximum
waiting period of 10 and 212 days respectively. We split the sample into different
periods and find that the average waiting period is 69 days before 2000. Between
2001 and 2008, the average waiting period declined to 47 days while the waiting
period further decreased to 43 days on average from 2009 to 2018. Figure 2
exhibits the trend of the waiting period over the sample period and the number
of IPOs.
Table 2 illustrates the summary statistics of the variables used. On average,
the offer price is PKR 24.75 with a standard deviation of PKR 27.64. The
maximum and minimum offer prices are PKR 235 and PKR 10 respectively.
The mean age of the firms is 13 years with the minimum age is 1 year and the
maximum age is 67 years. The result reports that leverage is 15% on average with
a median value of 4%. On average, the firm’s size is 21.01 with a minimum size of
4.24 and a maximum size of 27.05. The mean value of ownership shows that firm
holds 62% of shares after going public. Considering the underwriter prestige, this
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Table 1: IPO waiting period by year
Year

N

Mean

Median

Std. dev

Min

Max

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total
1995-2000
2001-2008
2009-2018

25
17
3
1
2
3
4
4
9
14
2
10
9
3
9
6
5
2
9
11
6
6
6
166
46
55
63

77.6
73.41
75.33
127
59.5
54.66
53.5
52
44.77
41.78
42.5
40
38.77
40
39.44
47.5
49.8
54.5
49.33
45.27
48.33
33.5
22.83
50.45
68.8
47.46
43.03

75
74
59.5
127
59.5
61
58
52
40
40
42.5
39
40
40
36
41
40
54.5
35
36
46.5
34
22.5
48.04
66.75
43.6
38

35.67
16.81
24.54
4.94
20.25
32.26
13.51
10.56
4.94
3.53
5.96
2.86
1
14.36
23.35
18.43
10.6
19.89
16.92
14.55
13.51
7.3
14.35
37.3
5.99
8.89

20
46
50
56
32
10
37
33
35
40
33
34
39
19
28
33
47
31
26
33
17
14
10
20
10
14

212
108
99
63
71
88
67
66
53
45
55
42
41
68
92
74
62
76
74
70
53
34
212
212
88
92

This table presents the year-wise position of waiting time.
The sample includes the waiting period of completed IPOs from 1995 to 2018.

dummy shows how many firms involve highly reputed underwriters, and the
summary stats depict that 44% of firms appointed high prestige underwriters.
Market sentiments are measured using KSE-100 Index from the offering to 30
days before the offering date and the mean value of market sentiment is 3%.
The industry variable is a dummy showing that non-financial firms issue 65%
of IPO. The price discovery mechanism, a dummy variable, shows that 84% of
IPOs are floated through a fixed price method. The hot IPO activity period
shows that 70% of IPOs went public during the hot IPO period. The regulatory
regime is a dummy variable that indicates that 28% of firms floated IPOs under
the CLA regime.

5.2 Determinants of the IPO waiting period
First, we use the Split Sample Skewness-based Box Plots technique to detect
outliers from the sample (Adil and Zaman 2020). We identify ten IPOs as outliers which reduces the sample to 156 IPOs. Table 3 shows the factors that cause
the IPO waiting period listed on the PSX from 1995 to 2018. Model 1 presents
the results of endogenous factors. The coefficient of age is positive and signifiBusiness Review: (2022) 17(1):43-68
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Fig. 2: Number of IPOs along and waiting period
This figure presents the mix of the number of IPOs in Pakistan and the waiting period from
1995 to 2018.
Table 2: Summary statistics of variables
Mean
Offer price
Age
Leverage
ln(Size)
Ownership
UW prestige
Market sentiments
Industry
Price
discovery
mechanism
Hot IPO activity
period
Regulatory regime

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

24.75
13.17
0.15
21.1
0.62
0.44
0.03
0.65
0.14

14
6
0.04
21.01
0.65
0
0.03
1
0

27.64
15.67
0.21
2.57
0.19
0.49
0.06
0.47
0.35

10
1
0
4.24
0.12
0
-0.16
0
0

235
67
0.98
27.05
0.98
1
0.25
1
1

0.7

1

0.46

0

1

0.28

0

0.45

0

1

The table illustrates the explanatory variables of the waiting period for the sample
period 1995-2018.

cantly affects the IPO waiting period. This evidence suggests that as the firms
get older, the time to be listed on the stock exchange is delayed. Our result
corroborates with earlier findings (Colaco et al 2018), which indicate that older
firms’ structure is more complex to deal with and may require greater scrutiny,
thus taking more time to go public. We find that the price discovery mechanism
positively affects the waiting period and show that firms that went public under
the fixed price method take more time to go public.
Model II shows the results of exogenous factors that cause the length of the
waiting period. The result indicates that the hot IPO activity period negatively
influences the waiting period, implying that the hot IPO market’s waiting period tends to decrease (Colaco et al 2018; Beaulieu and Sodjahin 2008). The
regulatory regime, another exogenous variable, has a positive and significant
effect on the waiting period and shows that IPOs that went public under the
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Table 3: Determinants of the IPO waiting period
I
Offer Price
Age
Leverage
Size
Ownership
Industry
Price discovery

mechanism

III

0.0365
-0.78
0.2983
-0.76
-0.1070*
(-1.86)
0.5854***
-8.66
156
0.35
21.62***

-0.0014*
(-1.86)
0.0015
-1.11
-0.0794
(-0.85)
0.0094**
-1.97
-0.2101*
(-1.84)
-0.1001**
(-2.19)
0.4562***
-7.75
0.0605
-1.48
0.8514**
-2.47
-0.0687
(-1.45)
0.6840***
-10.3
156
0.55
18.23***

-0.0006
(-0.84)
0.0026*
-1.87
-0.0838
(-0.84)
0.0016
-0.33
-0.1664
(-1.38)
-0.0616
(-1.21)
0.4297***
-6.33

UW prestige
Market Sentiment
Hot IPO activity period
Regulatory regime
N
Adj.R2
F-value

II

156
0.21
6.92***

note: This table presents the results of the determinants of the IPO waiting period. OLS
regression is used to estimate the results from January 1995 to December 2018. Waiting
period = offering listing dates, Offer price = the price of the new share, Age = firms age is
the difference from year of foundation to year of IPO, Leverage = total debt/ total asset, Size =
firms size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Ownership = the proportion of
shares owned by a firm after going public, Industry = a dummy variable where non-financial
firms = 1 and financial firms = 0, Price discovery mechanism = a dummy variable where
book building mechanism = 1, and fixed offer price = 0, UW prestige = a dummy variable
where high reputed underwriters = 1, and less reputed underwriters = 0, Market sentiments
= market returns on offering date minus market returns before 30 days of offering date, Hot
IPO activity period = a dummy variable and IPO is issued in hot IPO period = 1 and 0
otherwise, and Regulatory regime = a dummy variable where the CLA regime = 1 and SECP
= 0. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, and * show the statistical significance at
1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.

CLA regime take more time to be listed on the stock exchange. However, other
variables in the model are insignificant.
In Model III, we examine the combined effect of endogenous and exogenous
factors on the IPO waiting period. The offer price coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level illustrating that an increase in offer price
causes the waiting period to decrease, which means a higher offer price leads to
list IPOs quickly (Colaco et al 2018; Guo and Brooks 2009). The size coefficient
is positive and significant at 5%, demonstrating that large-sized firms may take
more time to list on the stock exchange. Our result demonstrates a negative
impact of ownership on the waiting period which shows that firms with large
shareholding after IPOs have a short waiting period (Guo and Brooks 2009). We
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can argue that firms hold the majority of the shares when going public; they
intend to enhance growth rather than pay their debts; hence the duration of
the waiting period is lower. The industry variable negatively affects the length
of the waiting period, which suggests that non-financial firms take less time to
go public than financial firms. Moreover, non-financial firms may expect higher
growth and expansion in the particular sector which eventually faster the process of IPOs being listed.
Market sentiments play a vital role while determining the listing time of
IPOs. We find that IPOs are likely to take more time in conducive market conditions. One possible reason for the delayed waiting period is that many firms
subscribe for new issues that result in bulk of pending IPOs and take more
time to go public during favorable market conditions. In this model, the price
discovery mechanism and regulatory regime are statistically significant factors
of the IPO waiting period. However, the firm’s age, leverage, UW prestige, and
hot IPO activity period are insignificant.

5.3 Waiting period and IPO underpricing
This section examines the effect of the waiting period on IPO underpricing, and
the results are reported in Table 4. Probing the waiting period’s impact on underpricing, Kumar (2004) argues that a long waiting period causes uncertainty
and risk associated with the offer price. With an increase in the waiting period, investors face illiquidity that can be compensated by offering a lower share
price, affecting underpricing. Moreover, investigating the impact of the waiting
period on underpricing, Colaco et al (2018) document that average underpricing
increases as the waiting period increases since a more extended waiting period
involves a greater risk of uncertainty. Model I show that the waiting period positively impacts IPO underpricing. This indicates the waiting period increases
the uncertainty, which as a result, increases the average underpricing.
Other ex-ante uncertainty factors can also affect IPO underpricing. The offer price coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that a higher offer price
leads to lower underpricing. We can also argue that an increased offer price predicts a lower level of underpricing because a high price provides less margin to
yield higher returns on the first and twenty-first trading days if all other things
are constant. The coefficient of leverage is positive and significantly influences
initial returns. High leverage refers to higher debt obligations, leading to higher
uncertainty in future performance, thereby inflating the IPO underpricing (Hermin and Murhadi 2015). Our result indicates that ROA is inversely affecting
initial returns. This implies that a higher ROA suggests the firm’s ability to
generate profits and shows less uncertainty associated with a firm’s survival;
thus, IPO underpricing would be lower (Adam et al 2015).
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We also interact the waiting period with the crisis period to investigate how
differently investors behave. The coefficient of WP x Crisis is positive and statistically significant at a 1% level. This elaborates that a higher waiting time
during a crisis period creates risk and uncertainty, increasing the likelihood of
higher underpricing. The WP x Regulatory regime coefficient directly affects
IPO underpricing, which shows that the waiting period under the CLA regime
is higher than the SECP regime, thereby increasing the IPO underpricing. However, the rest of the variables are insignificant. In Models II and III, we separately
analyze the effect of interaction terms. Model II shows that a higher length of
the waiting period in the presence of a crisis period increases the likelihood of
uncertainty and risk, which ultimately increases the level of underpricing. In
Model III, we find that a higher waiting period in the wake of the CLA regime
has no effect on IPO underpricing.

Table 4: Effect of waiting period on IPO underpricing
I
Waiting period
Offer price
Leverage
ROA
Size
Price discovery
mechanism
UW prestige
Industry
WP x Crisis
WP x Regulatory regime
Constant
observations
R2

II

III

0.0053*
-1.77
-0.0034**
(-2.15)
0.3764*
-1.84
-2.2511***
(-3.26)
-0.1053
(-0.72)
0.777

0.0019
-0.97
-0.0035**
(-2.23)
0.1919
-1.02
-2.2382***
(-3.36)
-0.0107
(-1.26)
-0.0815

0.0027
-0.9
-0.0028*
(-1.67)
0.3376
-1.58
-2.1612***
(-3.00)
-0.0085
(-0.56)
-0.092

-0.53
0.7009
-0.78
-0.0697
(-0.68)
0.1111***
-3.53
0.0578**
-1.93
1.4810***
-4.34
156
0.214

(-0.70)
0.0126
-0.16
-0.0586
(-0.62)
0.0963***
-3.25

(-0.64)
0.091
-0.99
-0.1325
(-1.26)

1.4878***
-6.86
156
0.162

0.0268
-0.9
1.4827***
-4.15
156
0.133

This table presents the IPO underpricing results listed on the PSX from 1995 to 2018. OLS
regression is used to estimate the results from January 1995 to December 2018. Underpricing
= (closing price offer price)/offer price, Waiting period = offering listing dates, Offer price
= the price of the new share, Leverage = total debt/ total asset, ROA = net income/ total
assets, Size = firms size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Price discovery
mechanism = a dummy variable where book building mechanism = 1, and fixed offer price =
0, UW prestige = a dummy variable where high reputed underwriters = 1, and less reputed
underwriters = 0, and Industry = a dummy variable where non-financial firms = 1 and
financial firms = 0. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, and * show the statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.
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5.4 Waiting period and post-IPO uncertainty
Post-IPO uncertainty is gauged using return volatility which is captured by average initial returns from 21st to 79th trading day. Similarly, the return volatility
is measured for 142, 205, and 268 days. Table 5 presents the waiting period’s
results and post-IPO uncertainty listed on the PSX from 1995 to 2017. Panel A
shows the mean and median values of the short and long IPO waiting periods.
The mean return volatility of short and long waiting time IPOs are 3.09% and
2.43% respectively for the 21st to 79th day. With an increase in the time horizon, post-IPO return volatility of the long waiting period is marginally higher
than the short waiting period.
Panel B (Table 5) presents the multivariate results of post-IPO uncertainty.
Model I estimate the determinants of return volatility for 21 to 79 days. We find
that the coefficient of the waiting period is positive and significantly affects the
return volatility. This evidence holds that when uncertainty is involved before
the issuance of IPO, as firms take more time to go public, their pricing performance in the aftermarket will be affected. Consequently, return volatility will
be high. In short, we can infer that firms with long waiting periods face higher
post-IPO uncertainty.
Our result shows a negative relationship between underwriter prestige and
returns volatility, implying that IPOs led by highly prestigious underwriters
bear less post-IPO uncertainty. The industry’s coefficient is negative and significant at 1%, meaning non-financial firms have less post-IPO uncertainty than
financial firms. Analyzing the effect of a regulatory regime on the post-IPO
uncertainty, we find a negative association illustrating that the aftermarket’s
return volatility is less if the IPO is placed under the SECP regime. Issuing size
of the IPO is used as a proxy of uncertainty for post-IPO analysis (Beatty and
Ritter 1986). Our result confirms that issuing size negatively affects the return
volatility which explains that large-sized issues create less uncertainty in the
aftermarket (Agathee et al 2014). We can further argue that large-sized firms
are associated with less risk and uncertainty regarding the short- and long-run
performance.
Model II refers to determinants of return volatility from 21 to 142 trading
days. We find that the return volatility under the SECP regime is lower as
those IPOs are listed on the stock market and have the potential to generate
revenues and earn profit. The result also shows that large-sized issues have less
return volatility in the long run. The crisis variable is positive and significant
in Models II-IV which represents that IPOs issued during the financial crisis of
2007/2008 face high volatility returns. The result endorses that the crisis period
hurts the pricing performance of IPOs in the long run as business slows down
during the crisis period. We also report that large-sized firms may have a lower
risk; therefore, IPOs are listed in a short period (Models III and IV).
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to
to
to
to

+79 days post-IPO
+142 days post-IPO
+205 days post-IPO
+268 days post-IPO

76
76
76
76

N
0.0309
0.0311
0.0233
0.0247

Mean
0.0027
0.0031
0.0031
0.0035

Median
69
69
69
69

N

Long waiting period

Table 5: Waiting period and post-IPO uncertainty Part 1
Short waiting period

0.024
0.029
0.022
0.025

Mean
0.0028
0.0038
0.0043
0.0049

Median

Note: This table presents the results of the waiting period and post-IPO uncertainty. OLS regression is used to estimate the results
from January 1995 to December 2017. Mode I to IV estimate the determinants of post-IPO return volatility from +21 to +79 days,
+21 to +142 days, +21 to +205 days, and +21 to +268 days respectively. Waiting period = offering listing dates, UW prestige=
a dummy variable where high reputed underwriters = 1, and less reputed underwriters = 0, Industry = a dummy variable where
non-financial firms = 1 and financial firms = 0, Regulatory regime = a dummy variable where the CLA regime = 1 and SECP = 0,
Issuing size = the natural logarithm of the number of shares issued multiplied by offer price, Crisis = a dummy variable refers
to the financial crisis of 2007/2008 = 1 and 0 otherwise, Size = firms size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.
t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, and * show the statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.

+21
+21
+21
+21

Post-IPO return volatility

Panel A:
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0.3211**
-1.99
150
3.31***
0.143

(-1.79)
-0.1404*
(-1.70)

0.0105*
-1.87
-0.3010*
(-1.71)
-0.5180***
(-2.83)
-0.4746*

2.7120*
-1.83
150
1.83*
0.071

(-1.73)
-1.0510*
(-1.82)
3.8511**
-2.2

-3.4203*

II

2.4303**
-2.29
-0.1580**
(-2.24)
4.4369***
-3.01
150
2.41**
0.063

III

1.6426**
-1.7
-1.3490**
(-2.47)
4.4300***
-2.98
150
3.01**
0.077

IV

Note: This table presents the results of the waiting period and post-IPO uncertainty. OLS regression is used to estimate the results from
January 1995 to December 2017. Mode I to IV estimate the determinants of post-IPO return volatility from +21 to +79 days,+21 to
+142 days +21 to +205 days, and +21 to +268 days respectively. Waiting period = offering listing dates, UW prestige= a dummy variable
where high reputed underwriters = 1, and less reputed underwriters = 0, Industry = a dummy variable where non-financial firms = 1 and
financial firms = 0 Regulatory regime = a dummy variable where the CLA regime = 1 and SECP = 0, Issuing size = the natural logarithm
of the number of shares issued multiplied by offer price, Crisis = a dummy variable refers to the financial crisis of 2007/2008 = 1
and 0 otherwise, Size = firms size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
***, **, and * show the statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.

No. of observations
F-value
R2

Constant

Size

Crisis

Issuing size

Regulatory
regime

Industry

UW prestige

Panel B: Impact of waiting period on post-IPO return volatility
Waiting period

I

Table 6: Waiting period and post-IPO uncertainty Part 2
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5.5 Waiting period and long-run IPO performance
The average one-year BHAR for the short and long waiting time is -11.43% and
-23.07% respectively after the IPO’s execution. This finding shows that short
waiting period IPOs perform betterthan long waiting period IPOs after adjusting the size-based matched firm index. Over two years, the average BHAR for
the short and long waiting time is -14.99% and -21.53% respectively. The average BHAR for the short waiting period of three years is -15.26% whereas the
average BHAR for the long waiting period is -23.42%. We can infer that higher
waiting time IPOs lead to higher underperformance.

Table 7: Impact of waiting period on buy and hold abnormal returns
I
Waiting period
Constant
Observations
R2

0.4053*
-1.79
14.1649
-0.93
147
0.0133

II

III

0.4089
-1.22
4.1917
-0.2
145
0.0082

0.4105
-0.87
4.5461
-1.62
144
0.0047

Note: This table presents the results of the waiting period and long-run performance. The
effect of the waiting period is measured on the first (Model I), second (Model II), and three
(Model III) years of IPO performance using the BHAR. Waiting period = offering listing
dates. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. * shows the statistical significance at the 10%
level.

Table 6 shows the results of the effect of the waiting period on long-run IPO
performance. Model I estimate the impact of one-year pricing performance on
IPO waiting time and reports a direct relationship. This evidence suggests that
a long waiting period leads to higher underperformance; however, this finding
does not hold over two- or three-year IPO performance (Models II and III). This
study examines the effect of short and long waiting periods on monthly excess
returns using the calendar time portfolio approach. We employ the Fama-French
and Carhart models to estimate our results. Table 7 exhibits the waiting time
and long-run performance results along with SMB, HML, and WML. The results
of the Fama-French model are shown in Models I and II whereas Models III and
IV demonstrate the finding of the Carhart model. Panel A presents the effect of
monthly portfolio returns over one year. The alpha coefficient is negative and
significant in Models I to III, demonstrating that IPOs underperform during the
first 12 months after listing IPOs. The coefficients of excess returns (RmRf) are
negative in Models I and III, describing that excess returns’ negativity affects
the level of underperformance. The coefficient of SMB is positive and significant
at 5% in Model 1 which explains that small firms obtain higher returns. In all
the models, HML is insignificant. The coefficient of WML is significant in Model
III which indicates that winners yield higher returns than losers.
Panel B presents the results of long-run performance over two years. The alpha
coefficient for the short and long waiting periods significantly tends to underperform. The market excess return does not influence the long-run performance.
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The coefficient of SMB is significant in Models II to IV explaining that largesized firms obtain higher returns than small-sized firms. The coefficient of WML
is positive and significant for a short waiting period (Model III). This implies
that winners get higher returns than losers in case of a short waiting period.
Panel C represents the performance of IPOs for 3-year. The results show that
market risk, IPO size, and growth prospects do not significantly affect long-run
IPO performance. The coefficient of WML is significant and positive (Model
III) leading to the fact that winner’s returns tend to be high as compared to
losers’ returns.

5.6 Comparison of the results with earlier studies
This section compares previous studies’ results (Colaco et al (2018); Guo and
Brooks (2009)) with the current study. To examine the determinants that cause
the waiting period, Colaco et al (2018) used a sample of 4763 U.S. IPOs from
1986 to 2011. They report that a high offer price decreases the likelihood of
waiting time (Guo and Brooks 2009). This finding suggests that a higher offer
price reduces the waiting period despite unseasoned issues floated in developed
or emerging markets. Discussing the ownership structure, the present study
demonstrates that firms hold most shares after listing; they emphasize enhancing growth possibilities rather than paying debts, decreasing the waiting period
length. Our results are in line with earlier studies (Guo and Brooks 2009). We
find that the role of underwriters is insignificant in determining the IPO waiting
period. However, Colaco et al 2018 document an inverse relationship between
UW prestige and the waiting period.
The coefficient of market sentiment is positive and significant, indicating
that the firm’s waiting period increases as many firms subscribe to the new
issues, resulting in the bulk of pending IPOs. However, Guo and Brooks (2009)
found that firms take less time to go public under favorable market conditions.
Moreover, analyzing the hot IPO market activity, this study documents that
the waiting period drastically decreases when an IPO is conducted during a hot
IPO period both in the developed (Colaco et al 2018) and emerging markets. In
this study, we find that shares issued under the fixed offer method significantly
influence the determinant of the waiting period. Our finding is consistent with
Guo and Brooks (2009). Analyzing the aftermarket performance, we find that
an increase in the waiting period’s length creates uncertainty, which eventually
inflates the IPO underpricing. Our result corroborates with Colaco et al (2018)
which state that underpricing rises as the waiting period increases in the U.S.
Besides, we examine the long-run IPO performance and its effect on the waiting
period. The result suggests that the waiting period’s length positively affects
the IPO underperformance (Colaco et al 2018).
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Table 8: Calendar-time portfolios: Waiting period and long-run IPO performance
Panel A:
One-year
performance

Rm-Rf
SMB
HML

I

II

III

IV

Short waiting
period

Long waiting
period

Short waiting
period

Long waiting
period

-1.5002***
(-5.42)
0.5874**
-2.91
0.1013
-1.33

-0.0744
(-0.12)
-0.012
(-0.17)
0.2004
-1.37

-0.1085***
(-11.22)
150

-0.1502**
(-2.31)
150
0.63

-2.020***
(-8.31)
0.1087
-0.58
-0.022
(-0.35)
0.2449***
-3.72
-0.3714***
(-5.26)
150
0.87

0.4602
-0.63
0.0231
-0.38
0.1768
-1.2
-0.1392
(-1.46)
-0.0356
(-0.35)
150
0.662

WML
α
observations
R2
Panel
B:
Two-year
performance
Rm-Rf
SMB
HML

I

II

III

0.1951
-0.67
-0.0056
(-0.06)
-0.0649
(-0.69)

-0.0681
(-0.32)
-0.0930**
(-3.17)
-0.0339
(-0.78)

-0.2612***
(-6.83)
150
0.807

-0.3299
(-1.57)
-0.2965**
(-2.88)
0.0283
-0.43
0.3309***
-4.25
0.6018***
(-5.80)
150
0.786

0.0124
-0.04
-0.0811**
(-4.24)
-0.0001
(-0.00)
-0.0544
(-0.58)
-0.1844
(-1.77)
150
0.817

-0.1822***
(-4.50)
150
0.235
I

II

III

IV

0.6487
-0.96
0.1597
-0.81
-0.1006
(-1.08)

0.0562
-0.09
-0.0607
(-0.82)
0.0137
(-0.18)

-0.4644
(-1.34)
150
0.252

-0.3175*
(-2.07)
150
0.064

-1.1914**
(-2.65)
-0.0237
(-0.25)
-0.0483
(-1.34)
0.3189***
-5.73
-0.4114**
(-2.42)
150
0.845

0.2216
-0.29
-0.0879
(-0.82)
-0.0157
(-0.19)
-0.0451
(-0.76)
-0.2731
(-1.75)
150
0.109

WML
α
observations
R2
Panel C:
Three-year
performance
Rm-Rf
SMB
HML
WML
α
observations
R2

IV

Note: This table presents the results of the calendar time portfolio.
Models I & II present the results of the Fama French three-factor model III and Model IV
show the findings of the Carhart four-factor model.Panel A, B, and C report the results of one,
two, and three-year performance. SMB = returns of small minus big firms, HML = returns of
high minus low B/M ratio,and WML = returns of winners minus losers. t-statistics are shown
in parenthesis. * indicates the statistical significance at 10% level.
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6 Conclusion
The number of days a firm takes from issuing the prospectus to the listing date
is reflected by exante uncertainty factors. The length of the IPO waiting period
depicts the accurate assessments of the overall quality of IPOs. Using a sample of 166 IPOs listed on the PSX from 1995 to 2018, this study investigates
the patterns of waiting periods. We found that (a) firms with high offer prices
are listed faster illustrating an IPO’s quality, (b) large-sized firms take more
time to list as they are more complex in terms of their structures and require
high scrutiny, (c) firms with majority shares after going public take less time
to enlist, (d) length of the waiting period is higher for financial firms, (e) IPOs
issued during positive market sentiments take more time to list, (f) duration of
IPOs under the CLA regime is higher, and (g) shares issued during hot activity
period take a long waiting period.
The study also investigated the effect of the IPO waiting period on underpricing. The results demonstrated that a more extended waiting period creates
uncertainty regarding new issues, increasing the magnitude of underpricing. The
results further reveal that underpricing is high during the crisis period. Considering the regulatory regime’s impact on the average underpricing, we used an
interaction term with the waiting period. The results confirm that the length
of the waiting period during the CLA regime increases the underpricing level
compared to the SECP regime.
The waiting period causes not only short-run performance but also longrun post-IPO uncertainties. We estimate the post-IPO uncertainty using the
returns from 21 days to 79, 142, 205, and 268 days. Our findings confirm that
IPOs take more time to list due to higher uncertainty in the aftermarket pricing
behavior. This study also finds that the waiting period has the predictive power
to influence long-run IPO performance. The Fama French model confirms that
firms with short waiting periods perform well over two years, indicating that a
short waiting period positively influences excess returns. The effect of SMB on
long-run performance suggests mixed results. However, WML inversely affects
long-run performance, implying that winners minus losers reduce the likelihood
of underperformance. We conclude that the firms with less ex-ante uncertainty
reduce the IPO waiting period and lower the underpricing and post-uncertainty.
Considering the above findings, we conclude that the waiting period is a significant factor in discovering the risks and uncertainties associated with an IPO.
The waiting period’s length affects the short- and long-run pricing performance.
When a firm decides to go public, it must focus on the exante uncertainty factors. It is also imperative to emphasize the exogenous factors that may affect
the length of the waiting period and help the issuers and investors to overcome
the riskiness associated with the aftermarket IPO performance.
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